

25X1




17 October 1957

25X1

Copy No. 138


# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

25X1

DOCUMENT NO. 39  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 7  
|| DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S.C.  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 1-4-80 REVIEWER: 

25X1

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



State Department review completed

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2

25X1A




## CONTENTS

- OK* 1. GROMYKO STRONGLY SUPPORTS SYRIAN COMPLAINT  
IN UN 


25X1A

- OK* 2. ZHUKOV REPORTEDLY HEADS SOVIET SECRET POLICE




25X1A

- OK* 3. INDICATION OF CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE ON SUDAN



25X1A

25X1



- no* 7. SITUATION IN LIBYA 

25X1A

25X1A

- OK* 8. THAI POLITICAL SITUATION 

25X1A

- no* 9. THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA 


17 Oct 57

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 2

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2



25X1A

1. GROMYKO STRONGLY SUPPORTS SYRIAN  
COMPLAINT IN UN

25X1A



Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in a personal letter to the president of the UN General Assembly on 16 October stated that the USSR is "prepared to take part with its forces" in suppressing any Turkish intervention against Syria, and called for immediate investigation of the "intolerably dangerous" situation along the Turkish-Syrian border. The letter coincided with and was intended to give strong support to Syria's submission of Turkish "military threats" for formal UN action. The Syrian request was reportedly the result of considerable prodding from Gromyko and other Soviet officials in New York and Damascus.

The Soviet demarche on this occasion is similar to its warnings to Eden, Mollet, and Ben-Gurion last November in support of Egypt, which were also within a UN context. The USSR is using the UN as a forum to blame the United States for any hostilities or claim credit if there are none.

25X1A

25X1A

## 2. ZHUKOV REPORTEDLY HEADS SOVIET SECRET POLICE

25X1A

Marshal Georgiy Zhukov "took over control" of the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) sometime during August,

25X1

The KGB, a government committee which was established in 1954 to take over the secret police functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), has been administered by I. A. Serov. The report could reflect the assignment of responsibility for general security affairs within the party presidium to Zhukov. There is a possibility that Zhukov gained supervision over the KGB as his price for supporting Khrushchev during the purge of the antiparty group last June.

With direct control of both the armed forces and the secret police, Zhukov would be in a powerful position to frustrate any ambitions Khrushchev might have for personal dictatorship. Khrushchev's actions during the last two months, however, have suggested an enhancement rather than a reduction in his authority.

25X1A

### 3. INDICATION OF CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE SUDAN

25X1A



The USSR is dissatisfied with the Sudan's failure to accept its economic offers of last August and has suggested Soviet-Sudanese ministerial discussions, according to an article in the Sudanese press by a pro-Communist Sudanese editor who is on an official visit to Moscow. The USSR is said to be ready to confer on projects costs and technicians for power, textile, communications, and irrigation projects. Soviet Ambassador Teplov has postponed his return to Khartoum in order to participate in informal talks with pro-Egyptian Sudanese Minister of Interior Rahman, who is now en route to Moscow.

There has been continuing pressure by the opposition on the Khalil government to bring the Sudanese economy into closer contact with the USSR or risk charges that it is courting economic disaster. Moscow and Cairo consider next February's Sudanese national elections an important opportunity for strengthening pro-Egyptian elements in the government.

Moscow concluded its first purchase of Sudanese cotton in June and leaked to the Sudanese press the text of its August offer, probably to the discomfiture of the Khalil government. The Sudan has a large surplus of cotton this year which it has been unable to market in the West.



25X1A



25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003300390001-2

25X1A

## 7. SITUATION IN LIBYA

25X1A

Libya's formal acceptance on 14 October of an Egyptian gift of arms and armored cars is a further indication of a weakening of Western influence in Libya. This action underlines Egypt's return to official favor in Libya, which less than a year ago dismissed the Egyptian military attaché for engaging in subversive activities.

King Idriss probably continues suspicious of the motives of Egypt and the USSR. The public and private statements of Prime Minister Kubaar and members of his government, however, give the impression of a turn toward neutralism. Repeated press attacks against the West have received only occasional censure. The promised replacement of Egyptian schoolteachers in Libya by less anti-Western teachers has not taken place.

The Libyans have not followed up their previously reported intention to request renegotiation of American base rights. They may be saving such a move for forthcoming talks on the relative roles of Britain and the United States in providing military assistance. When the subject is brought up, the Libyans almost certainly will refer again to pressure on them to accept Soviet aid offers. Libya now appears to be cooperating with the French in easing local tension on the Algerian border, and a French official stated on 14 October that the situation there was not serious. There is no indication, however, that Libya will stop cooperating with Egypt in furnishing arms and refuge to the Algerian rebels.

25X1A



25X1A

## 8. THAI POLITICAL SITUATION

25X1A

Although Thai elections are less than two months away, prospective candidates for the 160 seats at stake in the National Assembly are cautious in presenting their position. Much of Thailand is still under martial law and many candidates are reluctant to begin their campaigns until they are more certain of the latitude that will be permitted them by the Sarit military group.

While political alignments following the 16 September coup are still somewhat blurred, it seems likely that the conservative Democratic party, the pro-Sarit Unionist party, and the left-wing Socialist United Front will be the principal protagonists in the coming elections. There is some indication, however, that Marshal Sarit, the armed forces commander and actual ruler of Thailand, does not entirely trust the Unionist party, which he organized last June,

25X1

25X1

There are growing indications that the provisional government may soon move against the leftist press.

25X1

25X1

Interior Minister Pra-pat informed the press on 8 October he believed that a "certain number of newspapers in Thailand receive Communist subsidies." This strongly suggests that the planned government crackdown is imminent.

25X1

25X1A

## 9. THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

25X1A



The Aramburu regime has alerted provincial governors to possible disorders instigated by Peronista elements on 17 October--the twelfth anniversary of Peron's rise to power--and is holding emergency meetings with labor leaders in an attempt to avert a general strike called for 22 October.

A number of progovernment union leaders who helped break the Peronista-backed general strike of 27 September reportedly have joined forces with the Peronistas in demanding an end to the government's wage freeze. They apparently fear that continued economic hardship will lead to their losing control of the union membership. This situation presents as great a threat to the stability of the Aramburu regime as the reported discontent of conservative military elements who are demanding a crackdown on labor agitation.

25X1

